INTRODUCTION

ONLY WHEN NIGERIA ATTAINED INDEPENDENCE IN 1960, WAS IT HERALDED AS the democracy for black peoples of the world over. It had the largest black population outside of the United States of America and was the most populous African country; it was a new parliamentary federation and, more significantly, entrenched in its constitutions were provisions for the fundamental human rights of its citizens. Just as the first amendments (the Bill Rights) and subsequent ones of the US Constitution have has guaranteed certain individual rights to American citizens, the Nigerian Constitution has guarded certain rights of Nigerians. Since then, many scholars have looked up for parallels between Nigeria's colonial experience and that of the US, in particular on the issue of individual rights.[n1]

It was assumed that since Nigeria and the United States had a similar British colonial experience, the Nigerian Constitution of 1960 would have similarities to that of the 1787 and 1791 US Constitutions, in particular, the constitutional guarantee of human rights. This view was also repeated in considering the processes of economic growth and development of both countries. It was held that Nigeria could achieve technological advancement attained already by the US without going through the social disruptions associated with industrial growth. To correct these oversimplifications of issues of constitution and socio-economic growth, it is necessary to make an in-depth analysis of the histories of both countries.

This paper therefore seeks to address the issues of constitution in both countries with particular reference to the question of individual rights. First, we should note that despite the similarity of the constitutions, Nigeria's political culture is quite different from that of the US. Second, the process of entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Nigerian Constitution of 1960 differed greatly from that of the US. And third, an argument can be made that the non-observation of the provisions of fundamental human rights in Nigeria's 1960 Constitution by Nigerian leaders was contributory factor to the fall of the first Nigerian Republic in 1966.

For an introductory analysis, it is important to distinguish between the classical and modern concepts of individual rights. Essentially, the notion of individual rights derives from the theory of natural law, which emphasizes the rationality of human beings and dates back to classical Greek period. It holds that there is a superior law of nature underlying objective moral norms to which societal norms and laws must conform for the fulfillment of certain human virtues, which to Aristotle meant prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. A man is endowed with natural reason to discern this law. By the Middle Ages, significant changes had occurred in certain aspects of this concept. While recognizing the existence of a superior law, the Greek concept of man as a citizen of a polis underwent important modifications. Man was now regarded as a person who also belonged to to social groups within the state, for example a guild, the clergy, the nobility, or a town with corporate charter. As member of such a group he enjoyed 'privileges' or 'rights' sanctioned either by custom or law. Man's natural reason was no longer the sole factor for discerning the law. It was now associated with faith, which was considered superior to natural reason. Nonetheless, the Aristotelian concept that the polis existed before its citizens continued to be an important part of this theory. The theory did not contain the concept that a man or a person exists in a natural state outside the community[n2].

By contrast, the modern concept of individual rights is characterized by rationalism, individualism and radicalism[n3]. The rationalist character of the new conception of natural law was firmly laid down in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe by Grotius (1583-1645) and by Pufendorf (1632-1694), who established that natural law was self-evident, clear, and coherent. This meant that the rights enjoyed by the individual citizens under natural law theory had passed beyond the stages of human experience and faith in God and were now evident to human reason. This development in the assertion that man is a rational being, capable of guiding himself and of deriving from his reason a standard to judge his environment was accompanied during the same period in Europe by an individualistic theory of the formation of the State by the social contract theorists, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. The form and substance of the theories of these thinkers are essentially the same. In its form, the contract manifests the will of the individual "with the objective of establishing a relationship of mutual obligation which would not otherwise exist by the law of nature;" in substance" the content of the contract is the 'natural right' of the individual which is exchanged against a counterpart of equal or greater value: the benefits of society and the security of political organization". The basis of the themes of Hobbes and Rousseau is that "the social contract may effect a complete transformation of the original right;" in Locke it leaves the right unaltered because it is meant to secure it. Thus the contract provides the basis for legal and political obligations of the individual to the State[n4]. Nonetheless, it seems to put the individual against the State.

The radicalism of the modern concept is twofold: First, natural law theory has become to be interpreted as natural rights theory, and second, the theory pits individual rights against those of the community. The community will continue to exist as long as it fulfills the individual rights of the majority of its citizens. It marks a complete reversal of the classical concept of the theory.

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

In 1776 the American fathers in the Declaration of Independence wrote: We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation or such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and Happiness.... With these words they were expressing in very clear terms a new revolutionary "political philosophy based upon a particular notion of the individual, of society and of their mutual relationship," which very largely reflected the form and substance of modern European concept of individual rights and of natural law as contained in Locke's political theory. However, it is now argued that the philosophical background of the US Constitution was not just an adoption of Locke's ideas but that it also emanated from the political experience and culture of the American colonists during their colonial period[n6].

The American colonists by 1776 were successors to a heritage of the definition and implementation of human rights that took place in the drive toward a democratic form of government in Britain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It began with the Petition of Rights of 1628 which expressed the right of the people in Parliament to petition the king on matters of royal prerogatives that infringed on the rights of Parliament and individual right. Next was the English Bill of Rights (1688), which became an Act of Parliament the following year, and which asserted the supremacy of Parliament, freedom of religion of the individual, and the liberty of the people against encroachment of monarchical power and privileges. In 1689 it became an Act of Parliament[n7]. By 1765, the American colonists began to challenge the authority of the British Parliament to impose taxes on them or reverse the power to pass law affecting them without their consent. The Englishman John Wilkes struggled to regain his seat in the British Parliament against the political manipulations of King George III and his ministers. The shout "Wilkes for Liberty" resounded across the Atlantic Ocean as both the American colonists and the supporters of Wilkes believed that they were fighting against an arbitrary and corrupt government, an authoritarian parliament and a decadent electoral system. Wilkes represented an individual challenge for the right of freedom of speech and for parliamentary reforms while the Americans employed the language of a new democratic revolution that could be deduced logically from the sequence of political events of the period and from political theories emphasizing the rights of Englishmen to liberty[n8].

Furthermore, the early American colonists were influenced by the concept of "charter," "covenant" or "compact" which set out the terms on which religious groups, towns and colonies would conduct their venture. This process eventually led to the federative principle in both religion and politics whereby church congregations federated to form larger bodies in a Presbyterian fashion and states such as Rhode Island began as a federation of towns. The New England Confederation of 1643 was the first of its kind[n9].

By the eighteenth century, the more secular words, "compact" or "constitution" had replaced "covenant" and the habit of constitution making was already established in America. The preamble of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, for instance, says:

The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals. It is a social compact, by which the people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common goal.[n10]

The recognition of popular rights is also clearly stated in this preamble to the US Constitution of 1787:

We the people of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and established this Constitution for the United States of America.[n11]

Since the preambles to constitutions do not have the same legal effect as the clauses, it become necessary to introduced the Bill of Rights first and the Constitution of each state in various forms and in 1791 into the Federal Constitution itself. The first Ten Amendments (or Bill of Rights) assure the freedom of speech and religion, the security of individual homes, and the other fundamental liberties including safeguards for persons suspected or change with crime. The Fifth Amendment contains the broad guarantee that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty or property without process of law..." These Amendments were to protect the individual against oppression by the ferederal government but it was not until 1868 that the US Constitution was amended to safeguard individual rights against violation by state (reference Amendment 14 section 1). The Fifteenth, Nineteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments enlarged the electoral process by granting voting rights to blacks and women and eliminating tax requirements as a condition for voting in election.[n12]

An important development in the US has been the role of the Supreme Court in interpreting the constitutional rights of individual citizens, leading to the notion of judicial supremacy. The decisions of the Court, however, reflected not only the textual interpretation of the constitutional provisions but also the prevailing societal conditions. Thus, since the 1930s, the Court has widened constitutional protection for speech, religion, press and property; it has provided procedural safeguards for those accused of crime and the basis of the electoral system, and it has desegrated schools. Adjudication on individual rights has become an instrument of reform, reflecting the mood and changes within American society.[n13] The roots of Nigerian constitutionalism, however, were radically different.

One major trend that run through the moral foundation of the plural society in Nigeria during the pre-colonial period was the Aristotel concept of the polity. Society was recognized as an organic entity. Each social, political and economic institution has its integrative role, with each contributing to the stability and welfare of the polity which was paramount. Society recognized the family and its political, social, and economic rights, but certain virtues such as wisdom, knowledge, piety, bravery and good neighborliness could be achieved by the individual only living in a community.[n14]

Many pre-colonial Nigerian societies had clearly defined laws but many acts of behavior were governed by traditions and taboos that were effective. Therefore in Nigeria's traditional society, the state was an organic concept. In contrast to the situation in American where individualism prevails, that individual could not subsist without the state because it has the individual. States with centralized political institutions in Nigeria, for example the Habe States and their successors in the nineteenth century--the Sokoto Caliphate and Borno Kingdom in northern Nigeria, and the Yoruba, Benin, Ijo and Efik Kingdoms in southern Nigeria, were ruled by an aristocracy that ensured that the individual conformed to the mores of the society. The ruler or king symbolized these mores and, supported by the priests or chiefs, was the keeper of the society's moral conscience; sanctions against individual violators of the mores given in his name [n 15]. The king ruled with the support of a council of chiefs whose interest it was to see to the maintenance of law and order and, therefore, the status quo. Innovations that received the unanimous consent or preponderant majority support among the rulership were often accepted by the ruler and his chiefs and introduced gradually into the community. The fact that such innovations were often presented with traditional explanations made them acceptable to the citizens and often difficult to distinguish and identify by a modern researcher[n 16].

In the political process, there was no clear demarcation between the legislative, judicial and executive powers of the rulers and the chiefs. This often encouraged a situation of excessive use of powers by some of the state institutions. It was part of the politics of the period for an individual to be aware of and conversant with such a situation and employ avenues within the political system to escape undue punishment. For example, free citizens often attached themselves as clients to powerful chiefs, or they might belong to powerful associations of traders or guilds of craftsmen.

There was always an interplay of politics between the ruler on the one hand and his chiefs on the other. The highest-ranking chiefs, who constituted the ruler's council, were often vested with the traditional power to select him as king. On the other hand, the king had the power to sanction the appointment of the chiefs to their posts. A clever king, therefore, would try to arrange a council of docile chiefs just as the chiefs would try to enthrone a weak ruler.

It is usually believed that a king's rule was limited by certain traditional constitutional laws. But that did not make him really a constitutional monarch directly responsible to the citizens. He was responsible to the chiefs who interpreted the traditions or taboos. If there was no division among the chiefs in their support of the ruler, no revolt was possible. To be successful any revolt would have to be led by the chiefs who commanded as their clients a large majority of other powerful interests in the society. The history of successful revolts in all these kingdoms demonstrates this pattern of events. Such occasions were not frequent. The change of the rulers was infrequent, ensuring political stability over long periods. The few occasions of successful open revolts leading to a change of rulers remain distinct. Moreover, they did not necessarily confer individual rights on the citizens of the state[n 17].

Conversely, among those societies that lacked centralized political institutions, the political process encouraged greater individual competitiveness and achievement. Society recognized bravery especially in war and success in trade or agriculture as important individual virtues that could be nurtured within it. More importantly, however, an individual achieved such higher virtues as honesty, justice and fairness only by living in a community. Indeed, the conferment of chieftaincy titles was linked with the achievement of these virtues by the individual, his material achievements notwithstanding. It was therefore regarded as the worst form of punishment for a person to be ostracized by his community. This demonstrated the force of societal laws, traditions and taboos in the development of individual character and achievement[n 18].

By 1900 Britain had finally brought the various peoples in Nigeria under its rule. That year, in his proclamation of British rule over northern Nigeria, Sir (later Lord) Frederick Lugard stated that the British would recognize the traditional rule of the Emirs insofar as it conformed to western standards of civilization. Judging from the local situation that conformed him, i.e., the lack of adequate administrative staff and revenue to run his administration, it was obvious that Lugard could not achieve his goal. It was no surprise that he introduced Indirect Rule and later raised it to a system that was applied to southern Nigeria upon the amalgamation of the country in 1914[n 19].

The indirect rule system sought to recognize the traditional political system but foundered among the Igbo in easter Nigeria because it over emphasized dependency on chiefly institutions. But it was successful in northern Nigeria, where the emirate system was adequately adapted, and was moderately successful in all other Nigerian kingdoms where the chiefs had constitutional rights to limit the power of the monarch[n 20].

Indirect rule introduced new changes or modifications into the traditional local administration. First, a Native Treasury was established into which all revenue was paid. This ensured that the Native Authorities (as the new bodies were called) possessed a financial base from which the salaries of the rulers, chiefs and some of the local government functionaries were paid and some social services carried out. Second, categories of Native Courts were established and presided over by the ruler or chiefs. Lugard saw the separation of judicial from executive power of the ruler as an important milestone in the development of a modern system of government. But, as has been shown in many studies of the local government during the colonial period, the rulers used Britain to maintain their combined traditional judicial and executive powers. Britain, while claiming to educe the powers of the traditional rulers, enhanced them.

The British attitude to traditional society was ambivalent. Britain sought to protect Nigerian society from rapid disintegration arising out of the impact of western civilization. Thus, Britain encouraged educational efforts of the missionaries subject to government control. In southern Nigeria, because of the desire of the peoples for western education, the government could not easily curtail the spread of education by Christian missionaries. On the other hand, in northern Nigeria Britain posed as the main interpreter of the interests of all the peoples there, and therefore restricted the activities of Christian missionaries to the non-Muslim areas. Even in the areas open to the Christian missionaries, there were many cases of direct interferences in their activities by the Muslim emirs or district heads.

In judicial matters, Britain allowed appeals in civil cases from the Native Courts to the Provincial Courts over which the District Officer or the Resident presided. British administrative officers were expected to understand the traditional laws and to apply them in many of the civil cases on marriage and inheritance. No western trained lawyer was allowed to plead in these courts. The British argument for this experiment was to protect the people from the full application of the common law as it might relate to individual property rights and so on. The result was that the traditional concept of individual rights, as it related to property rights, continued to be administered by the Native Courts contemporaneously with the common law practice applied in the Magistrate, High and Supreme Courts that adjudicated the English law.

The colonial state, however, recognized some sections of the society as urban[n 21]. These were designated first class townships, for example, Lagos and Calabar and later Port Harcourt. English law was fully applicable in these places. Here,an individual could ensure that his rights were respected by the state. Nonetheless, the British described such individuals as "detribalized natives," which became a pejorative term for educated Nigerians, for descendants of liberated Africans who returned to the country from Cuba, Brazil, and Sierra Leone or for the products of early Christian missionary efforts among the Yoruba, Ijo and Igbo. It was partly to assuage the political protests of these groups, located predominantly in Lagos and Calabar, that the elective principle was introduced into the Legislative Council of Nigeria by Governor Clifford in 1922.

Irrespective of these occasional glimpses of liberalism, the colonial state was authoritarian in its political structure. The governor was the source of every law; he was responsible to the Colonial Secretary in London for the governance of the country, as the legislative council was merely an advisory body. Indeed, the main focus of the ideology of the colonial state was the maintenance of law and order. Every issue was subjected to this over-riding focus. Even the Native Authorities were expected to follow this pattern, which explained the introduction of Native Authority police, Native Authority prisons, and the employment of poorly educated people to staff these institutions. To the common people, these new institutions represented organs of repression. The British did not recognize individual rights in Nigeria during the colonial period.

In 1945, however, the British came to advocate a federal system for Nigeria. As Sir Arthur Richards, the Colonial Governor,stated:

The problem of Nigeria today is how to create a political system which is itself a present advance and contains the living possibility of further orderly advance--a system within which the diverse elements may progress at varying speeds, amicably and smoothly, towards a more closely integrated economic, social and political unity without sacrificing the principles and ideals inherent in their divergent ways of life. The present system of government in Nigeria has many inconsistencies and by its nature is unsuited for expansion on a Nigerian basis[n22].

This statement may seem to emphasize the individualism of the citizenry but it does not, because the words "diverse elements" refer to the various communities that constitute the plural society in Nigeria. Therefore, the movement towards political unity among the various communities must not "sacrifice the principles and ideals inherent in their divergent ways of life." This statement more or less laid down the philosophical basis of the various constitutions Nigeria had between 1950 and 1960.

THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS 1950-1960

The next phase in constitution making in Nigeria was characterized by the direct involvement of the people from the grassroots level. The accusation levied against Britain for imposing the previous constitutions cannot hold for this period. Yet the guiding hands of the British were still visible in the outcome of the exercise. From 1949 on, consultations were held at all levels of Nigerian society as to what type of constitution Nigerians would prefer. The proposal before them was a federation of three regions, and was in line with what the 1947 Richards Constitution had laid down and implemented[n23]. The difference was the introduction of elected majorities in the Western, Eastern and Northern regions but the Native Authorities, which had played a significant role in the selection of unofficial members into the former Houses of Assembly, were now electoral colleges for election of members into the new Houses of Assembly that possessed some clear legislative powers. It was only in Lagos that elections were held directly into the Western House of Assembly. Apart from the East, both the West and North had Houses of Chiefs.

The Houses of Assembly served as electoral colleges for the House of Representatives, which replaced the Legislative Council. There was a provision for an upper house, called the Senate, with an equal number of representatives from each region. It was a unique process where a unitary system of government was devolving its powers upon new constituent member governments. Commenting on the process, the Drafting Committee on the Review of the Nigerian Constitution in 1951 said:

The federal governments of USA, Canada and Australia have been built on the basis of separate states surrendering to a federal government some of their powers for the benefit of all. The reverse process on which we are engaged--that of the creation of a federal government by devolution--is a political experiment for which...there is no precedent to guide us and we are very conscious of the dangers inherent in such an experiment[n24].

The devolutionary process and the fashioning out of the organs of government received the active assistance of British legal draftsmen and advisers once the majority of Nigerians, who were convinced of the intrinsic value of the Richards Constitution (or who were persuaded to accept this value), had signified their acceptance of the new Constitution, i.e., the Macpherson Constitution of 1951. A Representative Government thus emerged in Nigeria, but its philosophy was still essentially that of the colonial state. The house of Representatives

was given a plenitude of power to legislate for the peace, order and good government of the whole country except that the Secretary of State for the Colonies could disallow a law by the House even after the governors assent[n25].

Under the cloak of achieving its major goal, successive Nigerian governments, like their colonial and pre-colonial predecessors, violated individual rights at will.

In 1953, following political crises in the country and subsequent constitutional conferences, further amendments were made to the constitution which granted greater administrative, financial and executive powers to the regional governments. Four years later in 1957, the East and the West achieved responsible government; each had a freshly elected government in which the Cabinet or the Executive Council was responsible to the Legislature. In 1959 the Northern Regional Government and the Federal Government achieved this status. This was the step preceding full independence.

Between 1951 and 1960 the full details of a federal constitution emphasizing the sharing of powers were worked out. The regional governments were granted residual powers while the federal government had exclusive powers over defense, foreign affairs, currency, and so on. The judiciary was separated from the executive and the power of appointment of judges was vested in the Crown of England through the Governor of a region or the Governor-General of the federation acting upon the advice of the Judicial Service Commission either of each region or of the federation. In 1963, when Nigeria became a republic, the power of appointment remained with the Governors of the regions and the President of the Republic.

The behavior of the political actors, however, demonstrated their disregard for individual rights. The various Regional governments used their majority control in the legislature to pass laws against their political opponents in the name of effecting peace, order and good government. The customary courts (the former Native Courts) and the Native Authority policemen, where they existed in the country, were used as agents of harassment and persecution of political adversaries by the ruling regional government. Many of the victims belonged to minority ethnic groups, and in 1957 they began to ask for separate states for themselves before the departure of the British. After a hurried enquiry into their fears, the Willink Commission in 1959 suggested, among other measures, the entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Nigerian Constitution[n26]. The Commission had in fact recommended that the creation of new states would delay the date of independence beyond 1960; and since Nigerian leaders, in their haste, wished to be independent in 1960, they accepted the entrenchment of the fundamental human rights into the 1960 Constitution. But this was done in such a way that guarantees for individual rights were made subject to certain clauses in the Constitution that had been in operation before 1959. In effect, these clauses undermined the guarantees of individual rights in the 1960 Constitution.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC 1960-1966

The performance of the regional governments before 1960 provided a brilliant summary of the actions of the Federal Government of Nigeria between 1960 and 1965. At the center was a very strong executive which weakened the central legislature in its role of safeguarding the interests of the component units of the federation. The Government used its majority in Parliament as the British had used theirs in the legislative council during the colonial period. The official opposition was cowed. Its leaders, including Chief Obafemi Awolowo, were arrested for treasonable felony, tried, and jailed. Both in the regions and at the center, the tendency was toward the achievement of one party rule. The regional governments imposed restrictions on political parties with roots in other regions or in the minority areas. The misuse of the powers of Parliament was demonstrated by the abolition of the Judicial Service Commissions. Thereafter, the appointment of judges was vested in the Regional Premier or the Prime Minister at the center. This politicized the appointments and brought the judiciary under the Executive. The integrity of the judiciary became suspect.

Opposition to the regime developed among the people. There were many who believed in the constitutionalism of the pre-colonial culture and sought to revive this by leading an open attack on the government. Others invoked the liberal democratic principles of the British. As for the first group, it must be pointed out that their belief was a myth because, as noted above, successful revolt against a ruler must be supported by the chiefs, who formed a major part of the political system. But a myth has its own function in encouraging or deterring change. In this case, the people wanted political reforms, and the open revolts in western Nigeria and among the Tiv in 1965 fall into this category. The educated elite or the official opposition in Parliament to the various governments constituted the second group. In many instances, they believed in a constitutional means of achieving their goals, in other words, through parliamentary debates, newspaper articles, and protests. They were not prepared, however, to confront the regime openly and directly. And in fact, government use of legal and illegal means of controlling their activities and widespread imprisonment had weakened their position. This strengthened the hands of those who preached open violence to change the government.

The attempt by the Nigerian governments both in the regions and the center to enforce uniformity of views and behaviors was based on their adherence to what Governor Arthur Richards had described in 1945 as "the principles and ideals inherent" in the ways of life of the majority ethnic groups. Such as adherence to tradition and custom does not encourage innovations in culture, especially political culture. The rights of the individual were acknowledged only to the extent that they did not impinge upon societal values and norms. Nigerians had not in fact been given the opportunity to practice (or see in practice) fundamental human rights. The constitutions of the period under consideration reflected a philosophy based more on "the administrative concerns of the British colonial regime" than on "the real political (and philosophical) needs of the Nigerian peoples seeking unity in diversity[n27]."

CONCLUSION

This belief analysis of the philosophical foundations of the US Constitution and the Constitution of Nigeria of 1960 clearly indicates, I think, the wide dissimilarities between them. While the US Constitution embodies the modern concept of individual rights, the Nigerian Constitution of 1960 was at best a poor facade of the classical concept of the same notion. Even during Nigeria's Second republic 1979-1983, the interpretations given to the constitutional provisions on human rights were still very much at variance with those obtained in the US. The indigenous political cultures of Nigeria, as well as a markedly different colonial experience, failed to produce a political climate similar to that of revolutionary America. The failure of the Nigerian constitutional experience from 1950 to 1966 could be seen as a result of structural problems in Nigeria's political culture, which arose in part from British imperial rule and which contrasted sharply with the "benign neglect" of the colonial experience of the eighteenth century in the north American continent.

NOTES

[n1.] This was the approach of some authors at a conference on current issues in American studies held at the University of Lagos, 22-24 November, 1989.

[n2.] J. Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law (London, 1953), 107-110; A. P. D'Entreves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (London, 1970), 22-50.

[n3.] Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies, 118-123, and D'Entreves, Natural Law, 51-54.

[n4.] D'Entreves, Natural Law, 59. Also A. J. Bertzinger, A History of American Political Thought (New York, 1972), 4-11. William, Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers (New Delhi, 1969), 357-413; also Robert H. Horwitz, "John Locke and the Preservation of Liberty: A Perennial Problem of Civil Education," in R. H. Horwitz, The Moral Foundations of the American Republic (Charlottesville, Virginia), 129-156.

[n5.] Walter Lacquer and Barry Rubin (eds.), The Human Rights Reader (Philadelphia, 1979), 107.

[n6.] J. Kincaid, "Toward the Third Century of American Federalism; New Dynamics and New Perspectives," American Studies International, 22 (April 1984), 92.

[n7.] Lacquer and Rubin, The Human Rights Reader, 113, and A. Cox, The Court and the Constitution (New Delhi, 1989), 55.

[n8.] For details on John Wilkes' episode, see J. Steven Watson, The Reign of George III 1760-1815 (London, 1960), 131-146.

[n9.] Kincaid, Toward the Third Century of American Federalism," 99.

[n10.] Quoted in ibid, 99.

[n11.] Lacquer and Rubin, The Human Rights Reader,113.

[n12.] Ibid, 117-118; Cox, The Court and the Constitution, 138-139.

[n13.] See cox, The court and the Constitution, pp. 177-338 for more details.

[n14.] Aristotle in The Republic says, "Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no feet or hands..." Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers, 77. Also Martin Diamond "Ethics and Politics: The American Way," in Horwitz, The Moral Foundations of the American Republic, 39-45. It is characteristics of many writers, Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike, to stress the plurality of Nigeria and the subsequent diversity of its peoples and culture. In this they follow pattern laid down by the British to stress the administrative difficulties of running the country. See, F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London, 1965); J. S. Coleman, Nigeria, Background to Nationalism (Benin City, 1986), 11-15, and Obafemi Awolowo, The People's Republic (Ibadan, 1968).

[n15.] For detailed studies of Northern Nigerian Kingdoms during the nineteenth century, see Murrary Last The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967), Rowland Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906, the Sokoto Caliphate and its Enemies (London, 1971), Victor N. Low, Three Nigerian Emirates: A Study in Oral History (Evanston, Illinois, 1972), M. G. Smith, Government in Zazzau (London, 1960). For Benin Kingdom, see A. F. C. Ryder, Benin and the Europeans, 1485-1897 (London, 1969). On Yoruba see S. Johnson, History of the Yorubas (Lagos, 1921). For the Igbo, see A. S. Afigbo, Ropes of Sand, Studies in Igbo History and Culture (Nsukka, 1981).

[n16.] In 1859, the Ibadan among the Yoruba decided to emphasize filial succession to property rather than collateral. This was a revolutionary decision that was accepted only by the innovators and the succeeding generation. Thereafter, collateral succession became entrenched. See Johnson, History of the Yoruba, 226-327.

[n17.] For example, see the revolts by Bukhari, Emir of Hadejia and by Yusuf Emir of Kano against the Sokoto Caliphate in matters of succession to the throne; see Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy, Chapter 4, especially 94-103. [n18.] V. C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria (New York, 1965), stresses the individualism of the Igbo.

[n19.] Lugard, The Dual Mandate, 288-289.

[n20.] See B. A. Agiri, "Development of Local Government in Ogbomoso, 1850-1950" (M. A., University of Ibadan, Nigeria 1966); also J. A. Atanda, The New Oyo Empire, Indirect Rule and Change in Western Nigeria 1814-1954 (London, 1973), and A. E. Afigbo, The Warrant Chief System, Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 1891-1929 (London, 1972), for analysis of the impact of the Native Authority System on parts of Yorubland and among the Igbo.

[n21.] For more details see, Coleman, Nigeria; Background to Nationalism, 63-168.

[n22.] Proposals for the Revision of the Constitution of Nigeria Command Paper (Cmd) 6599 Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO) London, March 1945.

[n23.] See Nigeria (Constitutional) Order in Council 1954 for more details.

[n24.] Cited by Benjamin O. Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (London, 1982), 49.

[n25.] El Michael Joye and Kingsley Igweike, Introduction to the 1979 Nigerian Constitution (London, 1982), 27.

[n26.] Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them Cmd 505 HMSO, London, 1958.

[n27.] Jeremy White, Central Administration in Nigeria, 1914-1948 (London, 1981), 296.

PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): Dr. B. A. Agiri

~~~~~~~~

BY BABATUNDE AGIRI

Dr. B. A. Agiri is Associate Professor of History and Chair of the history department at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. He received his Ph. D. from the University of Wisconsin, Madison; his major fields are African economic history and American political theory. His recent publications include two joint works: History of the Peoples of the Lagos State (1987); and American Studies in Nigeria (forthcoming). Dr. Agiri is currently a member of the editorial board of American Studies International (Africa).

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Source: American Studies International, Oct91, Vol. 29 Issue 2, p55, 14p.